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1 INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the money bail system has come under recent
scrutiny due to its contribution to mass incarceration and its im-
pact on poor defendants [23]. Under the current system, a judge
may choose to set an amount of money (bail) that is required in
order to secure the accused’s release from detention prior to stand-
ing trial. If the defendant can pay the bail– either from personal
or familial funds or through a bail bondsman – the defendant is
released from detention. If the accused cannot raise the funds, he
must remain incarcerated until the case is resolved, whether by
plea or trial.
It has long been observed that those who are detained pre-trial
are more likely to be convicted [2, 16–18, 22], but only recently
have formal causal inference methods been brought to bear on the
problem of determiningwhether pre-trial detention causes a higher
likelihood of conviction [8, 10, 14, 21]. In each case where causal
inference methods were used, a statistically significant effect was
found.
In this paper, we also apply statistical methods to the problem
of quantifying the impact of setting bail on case outcome. Unlike
the previous mentioned studies, ours focuses specifically on the
population of defendants represented by an organization of pub-
lic defenders, making this a particularly vulnerable population de-
serving of specific attention. Our work is further differentiated
from previous work in this area in that we approach the prob-
lem using methodology from a different tradition for estimating
causal effects. Whereas previous studies have employed a stwo-
stage model-based instrumental variable approach that is common
in econometrics, we approach this problem using near-far match-
ing [3, 4], a matching procedure that derives from the “observa-
tional studies" tradition. To our knowledge this is the first use of
matching techniques in this specific setting.
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The work described here is a bit of a departure from that typ-
ically presented at FAT ML in that we are not developing a new
machine learning algorithm with fair outcomes in mind nor are
we critiquing existing algorithms. Instead, what follows is more
along the lines of an applied statistics project that, at its core, is
concerned with fairness and accountability in the real world. That
is, we assess the fairness of the current money bail system in terms
of its potential to cause those who cannot afford bail to be more
likely to plead or be found guilty. Due to length limitations put
in place by the FAT ML conference, figures, tables, and discussion
that would normally appear to support a causal analysis have been
omitted in this preliminary work.
2 DATA
i. Inclusion/exclusion
Our dataset consists of all felony and misdemeanor cases that were
handled from start to finish by an attorney from our partner pub-
lic defender agency in 2015. We do not consider cases in which
the defendant was extradited, the case was transferred to a special
court (e.g. family court), or very irregular cases (e.g. the crime was
abated by the death of the client). We also do not consider cases
that were disposed at arraignment, i.e. cases in which the defen-
dant immediately plead guilty or the judge dismissed the charges
at arraignment. We do not consider these cases to be part of the
population of interest because in these cases bail cannot be set and
the concept of pre-trial detention is irrelevant, as there is to be no
further trial and there is no pre-trial period of which to speak.
ii. Covariates
Our dataset includes a variety of demographic covariates about the
individual – age at the time of the alleged crime, gender, race, and
ethnicity. At the time of processing in the intake interview, the
defendant is also asked to report their employer, weekly income,
phone number, and address. We include an indicator of whether
the defendant declared an employer, their self-reported weekly in-
come, an indicator for whether they reported a phone number, and
an indicator of whether they reported an address. Although this is
all self-reported information, this is the same information that is
available at the time of arraignment, and thus is the information
relevant to determining whether bail will be set. Last, as a measure
of prior criminal activity, we include the number of prior counts for
which the public defender’s office represented that client in the pre-
vious year (2014). This is a noisy measure of prior criminal activity,
as it is possible that in 2014, the defendant had additional charges
but had different legal representation. It is important to note that,
despite the fact that there may be relevant variables (like a longer
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criminal history variable) that are omitted from the analysis, the in-
strumental variable method we employ allows us to obtain causal
estimates nonetheless.
For each case, our dataset also includes information about the
charges against the defendant– the type of the offense (misdemeanor
or felony), the most serious charge against the defendant (the “top
charge"), the class of the most serious charge (A, B, C, D, E). The
top charge in the case is a specific category that describes both the
nature of the crime as well as the severity, in most cases denoted
by the number following the crime description, e.g. “Assault 3".
iii. Outcome and treatment
Outcome. The outcome variable of interest,G, is an indicator of
whether the defendant was found guilty. Specifically, we setG = 1
if the final disposition of the case was a guilty plea (the defendant
plead guilty without going to trial) or a guilty verdict (the case
went to trial, and the defendant was found guilty), andG = 0 if the
case was dismissed (the charges were dismissed without going to
trial) or the defendant was acquitted (the case went to trial, and the
defendant was found not guilty). We treat G as missing if a final
determination has yet to be made.
Treatment. As the treatment variable,T , we use an indicator that
denotes whether bail was set in the case. Although our hypothe-
sis for how the money bail system causes worse case outcomes
revolves around pre-trial detention– not the setting of bail– pre-
trial detention only occurs if bail is set and the defendant cannot
pay. Thus the proximate cause of pre-trial detention is the setting
of bail.
iv. Instrumental variable
For the instrumental variable (IV), we calculate a measure of judge
strictness or severity. To conform to the conventions of near-far
matching, we calculate this so that low levels of the IV correspond
to more strict judges, and higher levels of the IV to more lenient
judges. Several other analyses have used judge severity as a pseudo-
randomizer [1, 13, 15]. In particular, [12] use a similar instrumen-
tal variable in an analysis how judges determine to whom they
grant pre-trial release and the likelihood with which individuals
whowould have been released would have failed to appear in court.
Other studies also rely on judge randomization or quasi-randomization
in assessing the causal impact of incarceration or probation on re-
cidivism [5, 9].
At the core of all of these analyses is the assumption that some
part of the decision-making process depends on features of the
judge, rather than the facts of the case, and that defendants are
pseudo-randomized to judges. Though we do not have room to
describe the process by which defendants are assigned an arraign-
ment judge here, we believe that this procedure meets the stan-
dards for pseudo-randomization. Our identification strategymakes
use of the insight that some judges are predisposed to set bail
(“strict") and others are less likely (“lenient"). More technically, our
“pseudo-randomizer" is a judge’s rate of granting pre-trial release
without bail, for a specific crime type, relative to other judges in
that region.
We calculate the instrumental variable separately for each ad-
ministrative region and crime (e.g. Assault 3), resulting in a judge-
region-crime-specific measure of severity. Similar to [10, 14], we
use a leave-one-out method for calculating this variable so that
the ith defendant’s own outcome does not influence the calcula-
tion of the instrumental variable for his case. Let Tjbci denote the
treatment variable (1 if bail was set; no otherwise) of the ith in-
dividual seen by judge j in region b with top charge c . We define
T ′
jbci
= 1 − Tjbci . Then, we calculate judge severity measure for
the i∗th defendant as follows:
S
(i∗)
jbc
=
1
n jbc − 1
(
∑
i
T ′
jbci
−T ′
jbci∗
) −
1
nbc − 1
(
∑
i, j
T ′
jbci
−T ′
jbci∗
),
(1)
where n jbc is the number of cases with top charge c seen by judge
j in region b , and nbc is the number of cases with top charge c seen
in region b .
3 METHOD
Current recommendations for best practices in observational stud-
ies of medical interventions typically favor a matching approach,
rather than the two-stage model-based inference that is popular
in econometrics [6]. In this study, we use near-far matching. The
logic of near-far matching follows the design of a randomized ex-
periment that suffers from noncompliance with the randomization
- this is sometimes called an “encouragement design" [11]. In en-
couragement randomized trials, some physicians are randomly as-
signed to be “encouraged" to perform or suggest a particular treat-
ment to their patients, others are not [7]. The result is that some
patients, even after accounting for their own personal attributes
or the severity of their condition, are more likely to receive the
treatment due only to the level of “encouragement" their physi-
cian received. Analogous observational studies in which there is
patient-independent variability in the physician-specific inclina-
tion towards a treatment can be undertaken in this setting if pa-
tients are pseudo-randomized to physicians. Methodology for these
studies exploits this randomized push towards receiving the treat-
ment to isolate the “natural experiment” that exists in the data [24].
Near-far matchingmimics a randomized encouragement trial by
preferentially creating matched pairs of observations that are (i) as
nearly identical in pre-exposure variables as possible (“near in co-
variates"), while (ii) being as dissimilar as possible in their pseudo-
randomized push to either be exposed or unexposed (“far in their
encouragement"). Pairwise covariate proximity is measured by cal-
culating the Mahalanobis distance between covariate vectors. A
non-bipartite matching algorithm is then used to find a set of pair-
ings thatminimizes theMahalanobis distance between thematched
pairs while maximizing the pairwise difference in the instrumen-
tal variable. In our case, this would look like finding two identical
defendants – that is, who looked the same in all ways measured
in our data set prior to the bail-setting hearing, but one defendant
was routed to a “strict" judge and the other defendant was routed
to a “lenient" judge. Note that within this pair we are attempting
to isolate the judge’s predisposition and use it as the determining
factor for bail-setting, rather than allowing differences in the facts-
of-the-case being the determining factor.
The causal impact of bail on case outcomes for indigent defendants FAT/ML 2017, August 2017, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
Matching-based study designs focus heavily on the task of iden-
tifying reasonable comparator groups and limiting the analysis to
those observational units. That is, we exclude observations because
the real world data set did not give rise to suitable comparators.
Most modern matching algorithms have a optimal ways for find-
ing the most “dissimilar" or “uninformative” units and removing
them from the analysis. In our study we use sinks– “phantom" ob-
servational units that have the unique property that they are per-
fect matches to all real data points. The matching algorithm then
runs on the augmented data set– real and “phantom" observations.
The algorithm will tend to pair hard-to-match observational units
to the sinks. In this implementation of near-far matching, we au-
tomatically select the optimal number of sinks by maximizing the
F -statistic of a hypothesis test that measures the “strength" of the
instrumental variable, i.e. the degree to which encouragement cor-
relates with treatment assignment. If a real observation is matched
to a sink then we remove that observational unit from our analysis.
The output of the matching procedure is a set of matched pairs,
{i1, i2} for i = 1, ..., I , where i1 and i2 are is the indices of the
encouraged and unencouraged defendants, respectively, in the ith
pair. Then, for example, Gi1 and Gi2 are the case outcomes for the
ith matched pair. Similarly, Ti1 and Ti2 are the the indicators of
whether bail was set for the encouraged and unencouraged defen-
dants, respectively, in the ith matched pair. Although not imme-
diately obvious, the instrumental variable is embedded in the sub-
script notation, as those defendants who had high values of the IV
are assigned to i1 and those with low levels of the IV to i2. Having
obtained matched pairs, inference is then a relatively straightfor-
ward. The causal relationship is measured by estimating the “effect
ratio" as,
λ =
∑I
i=1Gi1 −Gi2∑I
i=1Ti1 −Ti2
.
This quantity deserves a bit of attention to aid interpretation. In
technical terms, one can describe λ as a complier average causal ef-
fect of the risk difference which is conditional on the matched set.
It measures the ratio of the difference in outcome between the en-
couraged and unencouraged groups to the difference in treatment.
More informally, one can describe the estimate as the increase in
probability of conviction due to bail setting for those defendants
whose bail determination was likely to switch based on the type of
judge that presided over the arraignment.
The specific details of our matching procedure are as follows.
We first stratify all defendants in our dataset into top charge-region-
gender groups. These are the groups within which pairs will be
created, forcing an “exact match" on the top charge, region, and
defendant gender of the case. For example, female defendants in
region A whose top charge was Criminal Mischief 2 will only be
matched to other female defendants in region A whose top charge
was Criminal Mischief 2. Within these groups, we use the nearfar
package in the R computing environment to match similar defen-
dants to one another [19]. The output of this procedure is a set of
pairs of same-gender defendants who are each accused of identi-
cal crimes in the same region and who are maximally similar on
all other covariates. Paired defendants differ in that they were ar-
raigned by judges with differing levels of severity. Not all defen-
dants are paired– some are dropped as described to achieve the
best possible inference.
4 RESULTS
Covariate balance
After the matching procedure is complete, we are left with n =
61,486 defendants in our study. We first assess whether our match-
ing algorithm has successfully achieved covariate balance between
the two groups, i.e. whether the encouraged group is similar to
the discouraged group in terms of its observable covariates. This
is shown in Table 1. We find that we were able to obtain excellent
balance. For all covariates (i.e. all variables except the treatment, IV,
and outcome, which are not meant to be minimized), we attained a
standardized difference of less than 0.01. That is, the average differ-
ence between the encouraged and unencouraged defendant in each
pair for each covariate was less than 1% of one standard deviation.
This far exceeds the accepted standard that the standardized differ-
ences ought to be less than 10% [20]. These tables do not include a
charge or region variable because defendants were matched only
to other defendants who shared the same top charge and region.
So, in some sense, these tables under-state the degree of balance
by not explicitly showing that we have attained perfect balance on
top charge and region.
Encouraged Unencouraged St Dif
Guilty 0.41 0.40 0.03
Bail Set 0.21 0.16 0.12
IV -0.07 0.07 1.18
Age 32.69 32.71 0.00
White 0.28 0.28 0.00
Black 0.52 0.52 0.00
Non-Hispanic 0.65 0.65 0.00
Male 0.81 0.81 0.00
Prior Records 2014 0.54 0.53 0.00
Wkly Income 53.00 52.75 0.00
Any Income 0.12 0.12 0.00
Employer 0.17 0.17 0.00
Phone Number 0.15 0.15 0.00
Address 0.91 0.91 0.00
Table 1: Table of post-match standardized differences. Sum-
mary of data analyzed.
Generalizability
Because our methodology drops some participants from the study
so that we can obtain optimal matching, the next question to ad-
dress is whether our matched sample– the population from which
we will make estimates– is informative about the full dataset– the
clients of our partner public defender in 2015. Though omitted for
space, figures showing side-by-side comparisons of the population
used in the analysis to the full study population for each covariate
show no substantive difference in distribution. Thus we believe
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that the results from our matched group are generalizable to an
analysis of the study population.
Estimates
Table 2 shows our estimates of λ, our measure of the causal im-
pact of setting bail on the outcome of the case. The Est column
displays a point estimate of λ. The Lo and Hi columns give the
end points of a 95% confidence interval. The column labeled as n
reports the number of observations in each stratum. The final col-
umn indicates whether the estimates are statistically significant at
the α = 0.05 level. We focus attention on the estimate at the top of
Table 2 referred to as the total estimate in the aggregate stratum.
This is the global estimate across all case and defendant types and
the focus of this study. This estimate should be interpreted as fol-
lows: for every additional 100 defendants that are assigned bail sim-
ply because they saw a stricter judge, an additional 34 guilty pleas
or convictions will result that otherwise would not have. This rep-
resents a contextually meaningful increase in the probability of a
guilty finding if bail is set.
We also present stratum-specific estimates for a variety of strat-
ification schemes. The focus of our analysis is on the aggregate
effect estimate, though we report the others for completeness. For
many stratum-specific estimates, there is insufficient data to ob-
tain estimates with small enough confidence intervals to defini-
tively determine whether there was a positive or negative impact.
In some cases, the absolute value of the end points of the confi-
dence interval exceeds 1, resulting in an estimated interval that ex-
tends beyond the possible range for an estimate that corresponds
to an increase in probability. Although the interval contains out-of-
bounds values, we report them as-is to emphasize the instability of
those particular estimates. Due to the reduced sample sizes from
stratifying and resulting reduction in statistical power, statistically
significant differences between stratum-specific estimates are not
possible. However, these stratum-specific estimates are suggestive
sub-analyses that can be used to guide future research.
Stratum Est Low Hi n *
Aggregate total 0.34 0.2 0.49 56734 *
Region
A 0.43 0.23 0.63 17010 *
B 0.34 0.14 0.54 17936 *
C -0.07 -0.52 0.33 7290
D 0.66 0.13 1.35 12174 *
E 0.88 0.11 2.89 2324 *
Crime Type
Felony 0.22 -0.12 0.58 8448
Misd. 0.37 0.22 0.53 48286 *
Gender
Male 0.31 0.16 0.45 46118 *
Female 0.65 0.12 1.27 10532 *
Table 2: Estimated causal impact of setting bail on judicial
outcome
Sensitivity Analysis
Inherent to any methodology that relies upon instrumental vari-
ables is an unverifiable assumption regarding the IV’s relationship
to the (unobserved) covariates, treatment, and outcome. If these
assumptions are unmet, it is possible to estimate a causal relation-
ship where none exists. We perform a sensitivity analysis to assess
the robustness of our inference that there exists a positive causal
relationship between setting bail and conviction in a case.
Using the method described in [4], we find that in order for
the inference that there exists a positive causal relationship to be
false, it would have to be the case that there is some excluded vari-
able that increases both one’s odds of assignment to a strict judge
and also one’s odds of conviction substantially. The magnitude of
this increase would have to be similar to increasing the odds of
assignment to a strict judge by a third and increasing the odds
of conviction by half. Because of our confidence in the psuedo-
randomization process to judges, we believe that the departure
from randomization necessary to nullify our results is unlikely.
5 DISCUSSION
We find a strong causal relationship between setting bail and the
outcome of a case for the clients of our partner public defenders–
specifically, we find that for cases for which different judges could
come to different decisions regarding whether bail should be set,
setting bail results in a 34% increase in the chances that they will
be found guilty. Though we approach the problem using a differ-
ent tradition for analyzing observational data than other similar
studies, our substantive findings support the conclusions of the re-
cent literature in this area. That our estimate is significantly higher
than reported in other recent work is consistent with our hypoth-
esis that the effect of setting bail is likely stronger among vulner-
able populations, such as those who rely on public defenders. It is
also likely that our estimate deviates from other, recently reported
estimates because of how we define the population to which the
estimates pertain. For example, one of the recent cited studies con-
sidered only felonies. And, though it is not explicitly mentioned,
it seems that several studies include cases that were disposed at
arraignment, whereas we define our population to be cases that
have made it past that stage. Regardless, combined with the other
recent studies on the causal impact of setting bail, our study adds
to the mounting empirical evidence that bail causes worse case
outcomes. The real world implications of this are that there are
likely many people–disproportionately, poor people– who have
been convicted of crimes simply because bail was set.
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